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Motion and Order to Close Proceedings to Public (JC 41) 
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I. Overview 
A. Constitutional Protections 
§20.1 It is public policy to keep children with their natural parents 
whenever possible. The Michigan juvenile code, MCLA 712A.1 et seq., 
MSA 27 .3178(598.1) et seq., reflects such a policy: "This chapter shall be 
liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdic-
tion of the court shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably 
in his or her own home, as will be conducive to the child's welfare and the 
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best interest of the state .... " See also MCLA 722.628(2), MSA 
25.248(8)[2]; MCR 5.902(B); In re Mathers, 371 Mich 516, 124 NW2d 
878 (1963). 
In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated, "The interest of 
parent and child in their mutual support and society are of basic impor-
tance in our society and their relationship occupies a basic position in this 
society's hierarchy of values. Clearly any legal adjustment of their mutual 
rights and obligations affects a fundamental human relationship. The 
rights at stake are 'protected' and encompassed within the meaning of the 
term 'liberty' as us~d in the Due Process Clause." Reist v Bay Cty Circuit 
Judge, 396 Mich 326, 341-342, 241 NW2d 55 (1976). In Santosky v 
Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "The 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have 
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to 
the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a 
vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family 
life." 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution pro-
tect a parent's custodial rights. However, such rights are not absolute and 
may be terminated. There is no substantive due-process right to live 
together as a family. Doe v Oettle, 97 Mich App 183, 293 NW2d 760 
(1980). Parents are not held to ideal standards in the care of their children 
but to minimum statutory standards. Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 
NW2d 604 (1958). 
B. Relevant Statutes and Court Rules 
§20.2 Two statutes set forth Michigan's child abuse and neglect 
law. The Child Protection Law, MCLA 722.621 et seq., MSA 25.248(1) et 
seq., describes requirements for reporting and investigating suspected 
child abuse and neglect. The Michigan juvenile code, MCLA 712A.1 et 
seq., MSA 27.3178(598.1) et seq., encompasses juvenile court policy, 
jurisdiction, and procedure. The code defines circumstances for taking 
both temporary and permanent jurisdiction over a child. The code deals 
with both minors against whom an act has been committed (child protec-
tion) and minors who have committed an act (delinquency). It is important 
to determine whether a specific section of the code is referring to child 
protection, to juvenile delinquency, or to both. Delinquency cases are 
brought under MCLA 712A.2(a), MSA 27 .3178(598.2)[a]. Child protec-
tion cases are brought under MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. 
The code differentiates between the two types of cases, throughout, as 
those falling under §2(a) or §2(b). 
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In addition, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq., sets 
out the standards and procedure for taking jurisdiction over a child with 
American Indian heritage. The guardianship section of the Revised Pro-
bate Code, specifically MCLA 700.424-.437, MSA 27.5424-.5437, pro-
vides for the appointment of a guardian for a minor. In 1990, the juvenile 
code was amended to provide juvenile court jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing certain contested guardianships. The Michigan Adoption Code, MCLA 
710.21 et seq., MSA 27.3178(555.21) et seq., provides for termination of 
parental rights under certain circumstances. Finally, the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 USC 675(5)(B), requires states, 
including Michigan, to develop methods for ensuring permanent homes 
for children through return to their parents or through adoption to receive 
federal foster care funds. 
Practice and procedure in the juvenile division of the probate court 
are governed by subchapters 1.100 and 5.900 of the Michigan Court 
Rules. Other Michigan Court Rules apply only if subchapter 5.900 speci-
fies it. MCR 5.901(A); see also MCR 1.103. MCR 5.901-.927, .980, and 
.991-.993 apply to delinquency and child protective proceedings; MCR 
5.961-.974 apply only to child protective proceedings. MCR 5.901(B). 
C. Jurisdiction and Venue 
§20.3 The juvenile division of the probate court (referred to in this 
chapter as the juvenile court) has jurisdiction over cases of alleged child 
abuse and neglect and termination of parental rights. The juvenile court has 
no inherent powers: its authority to exercise jurisdiction over children and 
to govern their lives is derived from the Michigan Constitution and stat-
utes. Const 1963, art 6, §15; MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]; 
see also Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 NW2d 604 (1958). MCLA 
712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] grants the juvenile court jurisdiction 
over any child under 18 years of age found within the county 
(1) [w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care 
and maintenance of the child, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to 
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or 
other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a 
substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is aban-
doned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is 
without proper custody or guardianship ... [or] 
(2) [ w ]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, 
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, 
or other custodian, is an unfit place for the child to live in. 
Three more bases for taking jurisdiction were added in 1990. Subsections 
(3) and (4) permit the taking of jurisdiction over a child with a guardian 
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whose parent has failed to comply with a limited guardianship plan or a 
court-structured guardianship plan respectively, as described in MCLA 
700.424a, .424b, and .424c, MSA 27 .5424(1), (2), and (3). Subsection (5) 
gives the juvenile court jurisdiction over a child with a guardian whose 
parent has failed to both support and communicate with the child. The 
juvenile code's new provision for jurisdiction over cases involving 
guardianships corresponds to amendments of the guardianship provisions 
of the Probate Code providing for referral of guardianships to the juvenile 
court when a parent fails to comply with the guardianship plan. MCLA 
700.424c(4)(c), MSA 27.5424(3)[4][c]. 
Terms in MCLA 712A.2(b)(l), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b][1] are de-
fined as follows: 
(A) "Education" means learning based on an organized educa-
tional program that is appropriate, given the age, intelligence, ability, 
and any psychological limitations of a child, in the subject areas of 
reading, spelling, mathematics, science, history, civics, writing, and 
English grammar. 
(B) "Without proper custody or guardianship" does not include 
the situation where a parent has placed the child with another person 
who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the child 
and who is able to and does provide the child with proper care and 
maintenance. 
The second definition codifies earlier holdings that parents are free to 
place their children in the care of a relative or other person of their 
choosing as long as the relative's home is fit. See also In re Taurus F, 415 
Mich 512, 330 NW2d 33 (1982); In re Ward, 104 Mich App 354, 304 
NW2d 844 (1981). Placement, in and of itself, does not evidence a failure 
to provide proper and necessary support for the child. In re Nelson, 190 
Mich App 237, 475 NW2d 448 (1991). But see In re Systma, 197 Mich 
App 453, 495 NW2d 804 (1992) (temporary placement with mother's 
relatives just before her death did not preclude assumption of jurisdiction 
when challenged by imprisoned father.) 
Under some circumstances, the juvenile court's jurisdiction may con-
tinue beyond a child's eighteenth birthday, until age 20. MCLA 
712A.2a(l), MSA 27.3178(598.2a)[1]; see also MCLA 712A.11, MSA 
27.3178(598.11). 
A juvenile court should not assume jurisdiction until sufficient alle-
gations are made in a petition. In re Youmans, 156 Mich App 679, 401 
NW2d 905 (1986); In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306 NW2d 487 
(1981). Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Where 
a father stipulated to jurisdiction, there was no reversible error because 
the court had found sufficient evidence to support the taking of jurisdic-
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tion. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992). Both parents 
need not be culpable for the court to assume temporary jurisdiction over a 
child. MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] gives the court jurisdic-
tion over a child whose home environment, because of "a parent," is an 
unfit place for the child to live. However, it is important to identify both 
parents on the initial petition and to explicitly state why neither parent can 
properly provide for the children. Failure to identify the father early in a 
case might deprive the child of a placement with his or her father or might 
complicate attempts to terminate parental rights later in the case. 
A circuit court that has jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to divorce 
proceedings may waive jurisdiction of the minor to the juvenile division 
of the juvenile court on a prima facie showing of neglect. MCLA 
552.16(7), 712A.2(c), MSA 25.96[7], 27.3178(598.2)[c]; see also In re 
Robey, 136 Mich App 566, 358 NW2d 362 (1984). The juvenile court's 
jurisdiction over matters of child neglect and abuse is concurrent with the 
circuit court's jurisdiction over divorce. Therefore, it is not necessary for 
a circuit court to waive jurisdiction before the juvenile court may exercise 
its powers. Krajewski v Krajewski, 420 Mich 729, 362 NW2d 230 (1984). 
MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] requires the juvenile court to 
notify the circuit court with concurrent jurisdiction over a child that a 
petition alleging neglect has been filed. The requirements for notification 
are set out in MCR 5.927 ~md MCR 3.205. The juvenile court's failure to 
give the required notice is not jurisdictional. In re DaBaja, 191 Mich App 
281, 477 NW2d 148 (1991). Once notice is provided, the juvenile court 
has "unrestricted freedom ... to carry out its mandate," including the 
entry of an order permanently terminating parental rights. Krajewski, 420 
Mich at 735; see also In re Albring, 160 Mich App 750, 408 NW2d 545 
(1987). 
The question whether an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the 
juvenile court may be collaterally attacked has been answered differently 
by different panels of the court of appeals but was recently resolved in In 
re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 468 NW2d912 (1991). Earlier, some panels 
said that jurisdiction may always be attacked, even in a collateral proceed-
ing.ln re Gass, 173 Mich App 444,434 NW2d 427 (1988); In re Emmons, 
165 Mich App 701, 419 NW2d 449 (1988); In re Ferris, 151 Mich App 
736, 391 NW2d 468 (1986). For the view that the court may always revisit 
the legal sufficiency of a petition but may not collaterally attack the 
assumption of jurisdiction, see Adrianson and In re Dupras, 140 Mich 
App 171, 363 NW2d 26 (1984 ). The Waite court held collateral attack of 
the court's jurisdiction is permissible based on either the legal inadequacy 
of the allegations in the petition itself or based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence offered in support of the allegations. The Waite case involved an 
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appeal after <m order terminating parental rights in which the court held 
that insufficient facts were testified to at the time of the initial plea, 
rendering all proceedings in the case void ab initio. Waite, 188 Mich App 
at 208. 
Venue for proceedings to determine child neglect or abuse and to 
terminate parental rights lies in the juvenile court of the county where the 
child is physically found and is not based on the child's place of resi-
dence. MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]; see also In re Mathers, 
371 Mich 516, 124 NW2d 878 (1963). One juvenile court may transfer 
jurisdiction over a child to the juvenile court in the child's county of 
residence if the probate judge of the county of residence consents. MCLA 
712A.2(d), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[d]. A change of venue may also be 
granted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or if an impartial 
trial cannot be held where the case is pending. MCR 5.926(C). 
D. Definitions 
§20.4 Definitions for tenns used in the applicable juvenile court 
rules are listed at MCR 5.903. Of particular importance is the definition of 
father, which defines the proper party for purposes of child protection 
proceedings. MCR 5.903(A)(4); see In re Gillespie, 197 Mich App 440, 
496 NW2d 309 (1992) (father was held not to be legal father per statutory 
definition, and, thus, failure to properly serve him did not void termina-
tion of his parental rights). 
For purposes of reporting requirements, the terms child abuse and 
child neglect are broadly defined at MCLA 722.622, MSA 25.248(2). Note 
that the same definitions are not used to define the various bases for taking 
jurisdiction over a child in MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. See 
§20.3. 
E. Procedural Summary 
§20.5 Child protective proceedings are open to the public. The 
courtroom may be closed to the public, on the motion of a party or a 
victim, during the testimony of a child or victim to protect the welfare of 
either. The factors the court must consider in deciding such a motion are 
specified by court rule and statute. MCLA 712A.17(7), MSA 
27.3178(598.17)[7]; MCR 5.925(A). (See form 20.1.) Other than confi-
dential files, as defined by MCR 5.903(A)(18), records of the juvenile 
court are open to the public. MCR 5.925(D). 
A child protection case typically includes the following phases: 
1. report of actual or suspected abuse 
2. investigation by the Department of Social Services (DSS) 
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3. filing of a petition 
4. preliminary inquiry (if out-of-home placement is not sought) 
5. preliminary hearing (if out-of-home placement is sought) 
6. pretrial or plea hearing 
7. trial 
8. initial dispositional hearing 
9. review hearings 
10. permanency planning hearing 
11. termination of parental rights hearing or other permanent placement 
of child 
Steps in this process may be skipped. For example, if a parent enters a no 
contest plea to the petition, the trial stage is unnecessary. The case may be 
dismissed at any point during this procedure for lack of evidence or due to 
the court's finding that the child may be returned to the custody of his or 
her parents. 
A record must be kept of all hearings on the formal calendar. MCR 
5.925(B). The formal calendar is defined as all hearings after the prelim-
inary hearing. MCR 5.903(A)(6). 
II. Initiating Child Protective Proceedings 
A. Reporting Abuse and Neglect 
§20.6 Michigan's Child Protection Law requires certain classes of 
persons to report suspected instances of child abuse and neglect or face 
possible civil and criminal liability. MCLA 722.623(1), .633, MSA 
25.248(3)[1], (13). Those who must report include physicians, coroners, 
dentists, medical examiners, nurses, licensed emergency medical care 
givers, audiologists, psychologists, family therapists, social workers, so-
cial work technicians, school administrators and counselors, teachers, law 
enforcement officers, and regulated child care providers. Any of these 
persons who has "reasonable cause to suspect" child abuse or neglect 
must make an immediate oral report to the state DSS. MCLA 722.623(1), 
MSA 25.248(3)[1]. In addition, any person, including a child, who has 
reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect may report it to the 
DSS or to law enforcement officials. MCLA 722.624, MSA 25.248(4). 
Reasonable cause may be based on any number of circumstances or 
factors. Child abuse and neglect are broadly defined by the act. MCLA 
722.622, MSA 25.248(2). The pregnancy of a child under 12 years old or 
venereal disease in a child over one month old but under 12 years old 
constitutes reasonable cause to suspect child abuse and neglect have 
occurred. MCLA 722.623(8), MSA 25.248(3)[8]. The Child Protection 
Law withstood a constitutional challenge in People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich 
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App 706, 432 NW2d 409 (1988), where a psychologist was charged with 
failure to report suspected child abuse. But see People v Farrow, 183 
Mich App 436, 455 NW2d 325 (1990) (successful due-process challenge 
to criminal proceedings by man whose criminal conduct was disclosed by 
counselor pursuant to Child Protection Law). 
All legally recognized privileges of communication except that be-
tween attorney and client are abrogated and "shall neither constitute 
grounds for excusing a report otherwise required to be made nor for 
excluding evidence in a civil child protective proceeding resulting from a 
report made pursuant to this act." MCLA 722.631, MSA 25.248(11). This 
abrogation of privilege does not apply when the testimony offered neither 
concerned a report of abuse or neglect nor consisted of evidence of abuse 
or neglect. See In re Brock, 193 Mich App 652,485 NW2d 110 (1992); In 
re Tedder, 150 Mich App 688, 389 NW2d 149 (1986); In re Atkins, 112 
Mich App 528, 316 NW2d 477 (1982). When a mother attempted to assert 
privilege under federal law protecting records of substance abuse treat-
ment, the trial court correctly balanced the purposes of the state and 
federal acts by finding that the state interest in protecting children out-
weighed the federal interest in protecting the mother's privacy. In re Baby 
X, 97 Mich App 111, 293 NW2d 736 (1980). It is not a violation of the 
physician-patient privilege if a hospital provides medical information on 
children to a department conducting a protective services investigation, 
even without a parental release. OAG, 1978, No 5406, at 724 (Dec 15, 
1978). 
A written report must be filed by the reporting person with the DSS 
within 72 hours after making the oral report. The written report must 
contain the child's name and a description of the abuse or neglect and, 
when possible, the names and addresses of the child's parents, guardian, 
or care giver and the child's age. The report must contain other informa-
tion available to the reporting person that might establish the cause of the 
abuse or neglect and how it occurred. MCLA 722.623, MSA 25.248(3). 
If the reporting person is a staff member of a hospital, an agency, or 
a school, the act requires that notice of the report be given to the person 
in charge. A copy of the written report must be made available to the 
person in charge. A staff member cannot be dismissed or otherwise penal-
ized for making a required report or for cooperating in an investigation. 
MCLA 722.623(1), MSA 25.248(3)[1]. 
The identity of a reporting person is confidential unless a court orders 
disclosure or the reporting person consents to disclosure. "A person acting 
in good faith who makes a report, cooperates in an investigation, or assists 
in any other requirement of [the] act shall be immune from civil or 
criminal liability which might otherwise be incurred . . . ." MCLA 
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722.625, MSA 25.248(5); see also Awkerman v Tri-County Orthopedic 
Group, PC, 143 Mich App 722, 373 NW2d 204 (1985). On the other hand, 
"[a] person who knowingly and maliciously makes a false report ... is 
guilty of a misdemeanor." MCLA 722.633(5), MSA 25.248(13)[5]. 
MCLA 722.627, MSA 25.248(7) mandates maintenance by the DSS 
of a central registry system, the contents of which are to be available only 
to a limited group of specified individuals or entities. The statute allows 
inaccurate reports to be amended and records in which no relevant and 
accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to be expunged. A finding 
by the court that there was no neglect or abuse presumes that the report 
was not substantiated and must be amended or expunged. OAG, 1978, No 
5297, at 430 (Apr 28, 1978). 
B. Investigation by the Department of Social Services 
§20.7 The Michigan Department of Social Services (DSS) is 
charged by law with taking actions necessary to prevent further abuse, to 
protect children, and "to preserve family life where possible." MCLA 
722.628(2), MSA 25.248(8)[2]; see also MCLA 400.115b(2), MSA 
16.490(25b)[2]. Within 24 hours after receiving a report of suspected 
child abuse or neglect, the DSS must begin an investigation of the child 
suspected of being abused or neglected. MCLA 722.628(1), MSA 
25.248(8)[1). 
A report of suspected child abuse or neglect is generally referred to a 
children's protective services worker within the DSS. If a case involves 
alleged sexual abuse or exploitation, severe physical injury requiring 
medical treatment or hospitalization, or death from suspected abuse or 
neglect or if the suspected abuse was not committed by a person respon-
sible for the child's health or welfare, the department worker must notify 
and seek the assistance of law enforcement within 24 hours. MCLA 
722.623(6), MSA 25.248(3)[6]. Furthermore, the DSS must refer reports 
involving criminal child abuse, child pornography, or criminal sexual 
conduct to the prosecuting attorney. MCLA 722.628(1), MSA 
25.248(8)[1]. In the course of investigation, the DSS must cooperate with 
law enfon::ement officials, the courts, and appropriate state human ser-
vices agencies to identify, treat, and prevent child abuse and neglect. 
MCLA 722.628, MSA 25.248(8); see also MCLA 400.115b(2), MSA 
16.490(25b)[2]. Law enforcement is also directed to cooperate with the 
DSS. MCLA 722.628, MSA 25.248(8). If, after an investigation, the 
protective services worker believes that the involvement of the juvenile 
court is necessary, the worker may file a petition requesting court action. 
See MCR 5.961. 
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C. Preliminary Inquiries 
§20.8 If the juvenile court receives information that a child is 
within the provisions of the juvenile code, the court may conduct a 
"preliminary inquiry ... to determine whether the interests of the public 
or of the child require that further action be taken." MCLA 712A.11, MSA 
27.3178(598.11). A preliminary inquiry is an informal review by the court 
to determine appropriate action on a petition. MCR 5.962(A). It is per-
missible in cases in which there is no request to place the child outside his 
or her home. The protective services worker has the discretion to choose a 
preliminary inquiry or a preliminary hearing. If a child is taken into 
custody, a preliminary hearing is required. See MCR 5.965. (See §20.15.) 
At the preliminary inquiry, the court may dismiss the complaint or 
deny authorization of the petition, refer the matter to alternative services, 
or authorize the filing of a petition on a showing of probable cause that 
one or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within the 
jurisdictional requirements of MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. 
MCR 5.962(B). In a preliminary inquiry, "probable cause may be estab-
lished with such information and in such a manner as the court deems 
sufficient," suggesting that the taking of testimony might not be neces-
sary. MCR 5.962. A referee may conduct a preliminary inquiry. MCR 
5.913(A)(l). 
D. Emergency Removal of a Child at Risk 
§20.9 The procedure for emergency placement of a child is outlined 
in MCR 5.963. Typically, a children's protective services worker explains 
the facts ex parte to the judge or referee and submits a petition or com-
plaint requesting court action (form 20.2). This process can occur by 
telephone, and the written complaint is often submitted after the child is 
removed and placed in protective custody. If the judge or referee finds 
there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that home conditions would 
endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the child, an order for removal 
may be issued. A hearing is not required before removal. The court may 
authorize the person to enter a specific premises to remove the child and 
may direct the placement of the child in protective custody pending a 
preliminary hearing. MCR 5.963(B). DSS workers do not have the author-
ity to remove a child from the parental home without a court order. A peace 
officer, on the other hand, may take a child into temporary custody without 
a court order "if, after investigation, the officer has reasonable grounds to 
conclude that the health, safety, or welfare of the child is endangered." 
MCR 5.963(A); see also MCLA 712A.14, MSA 27.3178(598.14). 
Under MCR 5.963(C), the person who takes a child into custody 
under exigent circumstances, with or without a court order, must 
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(1) immediately attempt to notify the child's parent of the cus-
tody; 
(2) inform the parent of the date, time, and place of the prelimi-
nary hearing scheduled by the court; 
(3) immediately bring the child to the court for preliminary hear-
ing, or immediately contact the court for instruction as to placement 
pending preliminary hearing; 
(4) if the court is not open, contact the person designated under 
MCR 5.934(B)(2) for permission to place or release the child pending 
preliminary hearing; 
(5) ensure that the petition is prepared and submitted to the court; 
(6) prepare a custody statement similar to the statement required 
for detention of a juvenile as provided in MCR 5.934(A)(4) and submit 
it to the court or leave it at the placement facility. 
After emergency placement, a petition is filed with the juvenile court and 
a preliminary hearing is held. 
An emergency hearing must also be held if a child has remained 
home after the taking of jurisdiction and removal of the child from the 
home becomes necessary during the dispositional phase of the case. MCR 
5.973(E)(3). 
E. Petitions 
§20.10 The petition must "set forth plainly the facts which bring 
said child within the provisions" of the Juvenile Code (see form 20.3). 
The petition must be verified as provided in MCR 2.114(A) and may be 
based on information and belief. MCLA 712A.11, MSA 27.3178(598.11); 
MCR 5.903(A)(14). MCR 5.961(B) states that the petition must contain, if 
known, 
(1) the child's name, address, and date of birth; 
(2) the names and addresses of: 
(a) the child's mother and father, 
(b) the parent or person who has custody of the child, if other than 
a mother or father; 
(c) the nearest known relative of the child, if no parent can be 
found, and 
(d) any court with prior continuing jurisdiction; 
(3) the essential facts which constitute an offense against the child 
under the Juvenile Code; 
(4) a citation to the section of the Juvenile Code relied upon for 
jurisdiction; 
(5) the child's membership or eligibility for membership in an 
American Indian tribe or band, if any, and the identity of the tribe; 
(6) the type of relief requested, including whether temporary or 
permanent custody is sought. 
If the petitioner does not know required information, the petition should 
20-12 
Child Protection Law and Procedure §20.11 
state that. The petition "may be amended at any stage of the proceedings, 
as the ends of justice may require." MCLA 712A.ll, MSA 
27.3178(598.11). In In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375 NW2d 788 (1985), 
a petition to terminate parental rights did not violate the mother's right to 
due process even though it did not include her name and did not cite the 
specific statutory basis for permanent custody since it was amended to 
include her name and it specified the grounds for neglect. 
If the court requests, the prosecuting attorney must prepare the peti-
tion or review it for legal sufficiency. MCR 5.914(A). 
III. The Judicial Process 
A. Right to Counsel 
§20.11 A child has a right to counsel in child protective proceedings 
that may not be waived. MCLA 712A.17c(7), MSA 27.3178(598.17c)[7]; 
MCR 5.915(B)(2). Indeed, the Child Protection Law directs the court to 
appoint legal counsel to represent the child "in every case filed under this 
act in which judicial proceedings are necessary." The attorney is charged 
with "the representation of the child's best interests." The attorney is 
required to "make further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain 
the facts, interview witnesses, examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory 
and dispositional hearings, make recommendations to the court, and par-
ticipate in the proceedings to competently represent the child." MCLA 
722.630, MSA 25.248(10). The child's attorney may have access to hospi-
tal records regarding the child under this section. OAG, 1979, No 5446, at 
59 (Feb 23, 1979). 
The court may also appoint a guardian ad litem for a party if the 
party's welfare so requires. The guardian ad litem has a right to copies of 
all petitions, motions, and orders. He or she may consult with the attorney 
for the party for whom the guardian ad litem has been appointed. MCR 
5.916. Attorneys appointed to represent children under MCR 5.915(B)(2) 
are often referred to as guardians ad litem, but the court rules specifically 
differentiate those two roles, allowing for the possibility that the child 
will have both an attorney and a guardian ad litem. 
Under MCR 5.915(B)(1), the respondent is entitled to court-
appointed counsel at child protective proceedings conducted pursuant to 
the juvenile court rules if the court is convinced after reviewing the record 
that the respondent is financially unable to retain an attorney and desires 
representation. The court must advise the respondent at his or her first 
court appearance of the right to retain an attorney and of the right to 
court-appointed counsel if the respondent is financially unable to retain an 
attorney. A respondent may waive the right to counsel unless the respon-
dent is a minor whose parent or guardian objects to the waiver. The court 
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may assess the costs for a court-appointed attorney against the party or a 
person responsible for the support of that party and may enforce the 
assessment by contempt proceedings. An attorney appointed under this 
rule serves until discharged by the court. See also MCLA 712A.17c(4)-
(6), MSA 27.3178(598.17c)[4]-[6]. Practice in Michigan juvenile courts 
varies on the availability of appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing. 
See D. Duquette, Michigan Child Welfare Law: Child Protection, Foster 
Care, Termination of Parental Rights 62-63 (1990). 
At any point in the proceedings that termination of parental rights is 
being considered, the juvenile court must, on its own motion, appoint 
counsel for indigent parents unless such a right is expressly waived. In re 
Lockett, 160 Mich App 319, 408 NW2d 144 (1987); In re Keifer, 159 
Mich App 288, 406 NW2d 217 (1987). 
The right to counsel includes the right to competent counsel. In re 
Rogers, 160 Mich App 500, 409 NW2d 486 (1987); In re Trowbridge, 155 
Mich App 785, 401 NW2d 65 (1986). Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights are analyzed by anal-
ogy to the test applied in criminal cases. !d. A bifurcated test is applied. 
The first branch of the test focuses on the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. The standard for this test is set forth in Beasley v United States, 
491 F2d 687, 696 (6th Cir 1974), and was endorsed by the Michigan 
Supreme Court in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 247 NW2d 547 (1976): 
"Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary 
training and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously protect his 
client's interests, undeflected by conflicting considerations." The second 
branch of the test requires the appellate court to examine particular mis-
takes to safeguard the defendant's right to a fair trial. The standard for 
this test was set forth in Garcia: "However, even where assistance of 
counsel satisfies the constitutional requirements, defendant is still entitled 
to a fair trial. Defendant can be denied this right if his attorney makes a 
serious mistake. But a court should not grant a new trial unless it finds 
that but for this mistake defendant would have had a reasonably likely 
chance of acquittal." Garcia, 398 Mich at 266; see also People v Coyle, 
104 Mich App 636, 305 NW2d 275 (1981). 
Court-appointed counsel may also be available to respondents on 
appeal. MCR 5.974(H); see also In re Sanchez, 422 Mich 758, 375 NW2d 
353 (1985). 
The petitioner, the DSS, may be represented by the prosecutor, at the 
request of the court, at any child protective proceeding. The prosecutor 
must also serve as a "legal consultant" to the DSS, at the agency's 
request, at all stages of a child protective proceeding. When the prose-
cutor does not appear on behalf of the DSS, the agency may retain 
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independent legal representation. MCLA 712A.17(4)-(5), MSA 
27.3178(598.17)[4]-[5]; MCR 5.914. (See form 20.4.) 
B. Evidence and Standard of Proof 
§20.12 At trial and at any time the court is presented with proof of 
a new allegation, the Michigan Rules of Evidence apply. MCR 
5.972(C)(1) (trial); MCR 5.974(D)(3) (termination of parental rights at 
initial disposition); MCR 5.974(E)(l) (termination of parental rights on 
the basis of changed circumstances). At all other hearings, the court may 
receive all relevant and material evidence. The evidence "may be relied 
on to the extent of its probative value, even though such evidence may not 
be admissible at trial." MCR 5.973(A)(4) (initial dispositional hearing); 
MCR 5.973(8)(5) (dispositional review hearings); MCR 5.973(C)(4)(a) 
(permanency planning hearing); MCR 5.974(F)(2) (termination of parental 
rights or child in foster care). The admission of hearsay at hearings on the 
termination of parental rights has withstood constitutional challenge. In re 
Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 361 NW2d 20 (1984); In re Hinson, 135 Mich 
App 472, 354 NW2d 794 (1984). At the preliminary hearing, the appli-
cable court rule is silent on the admission of hearsay evidence on the issue 
of probable cause but states that the court's decision to place a child out 
of the home "may be on the basis of hearsay evidence that possesses <m 
adequate degree of trustworthiness." MCR 5.965(C)(3). The practice in 
juvenile court is to generally permit the admission of hearsay evidence on 
all issues presented at the preliminary hearing. 
The rules that pennit the admission of all relevant and material 
evidence specifically include the admission of oral and written reports. 
The rules require that opposing parties be given an opportunity to "exam-
ine and controvert" written reports and that counsel "may be allowed to 
cross-examine individuals making reports when such individuals are rea-
sonably available." See MCR 5.973(A)(4)(b) (initial dispositional hear-
ing); MCR 5.973(B)(5) (dispositional review hearing); MCR 5.973(C)(4) 
(permanency planning hearing); MCR 5.973(E)(4) (change in placement); 
MCR 5.974(F)(2) (termination of parental rights, child in foster care). 
Even when the legal basis for the termination of parental rights must 
be established through legally admissible evidence, all relevant and mate-
rial evidence may be admitted to establish that termination is in the best 
interests of the child. MCR 5.974(D)(4), (E)(2). 
A form of the tender years exception to the hearsay rule has been 
created for trials in child protective proceedings. MCR 5.972(C)(2) allows 
into evidence a statement by a child abuse victim under I 0 years of age 
describing <m act of abuse, even though the statement would otherwise be 
inadmissible hearsay. The court must find, at a hearing before trial, that the 
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nature and circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement are 
trustworthy and that there is "sufficient corroborative evidence of the act." 
The court in In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 401, 478 NW2d 689 (1991), set 
forth various factors to consider in determining the reliability of a child's 
out-of-court statements. In In re Brock, 193 Mich App 652,485 NW2d 110 
(1992), the court criticized the trial court for not making specific findings 
under MCR 5.972(C)(2). Note that for criminal and delinquency matters, 
there is a similar tender years exception set out in MRE 803A. 
Often a child's out-of-court statements are offered under MRE 
803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule. 
In People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 484 NW2d 621 (1992), the Michigan 
Supreme Court consolidated three cases in which a treating medical health 
care provider was called to testify to the child's statements concerning 
abuse and the identity of the abuser. The court held that for admission 
under MRE 803(4), it must first be established that the child understood 
the need to tell the truth to the physician. To prove the child's understand-
ing of the need to tell the truth, the court should look at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement. It should consider 
factors such as the age and maturity of the child, the manner in which the 
statements are elicited and phrased, the use of terminology unexpected of 
a child of similar age, the person who initiated the examination, the 
statement's timing in relation to the assault and trial, the type of examina-
tion, the relation of the child to the person identified as the assailant, and 
the existence or lack of motivation to fabricate. The reliability of the 
statement is strengthened when supported by other evidence, such as 
corroborating physical evidence, evidence that the alleged assailant had 
an opportunity to commit the assault, and the resulting diagnosis and 
treatment of the child. As a second step, the statement must have been 
reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment. See also White v llli-
nois, 112 S Ct 736 (1992); Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805 (1990). 
Other special evidentiary principles have developed in child protec-
tive proceedings. Evidence of how a parent treats one child is admissible 
to show how that parent might treat other children. In re Andeson, 155 
Mich App 615, 400 NW2d 330 (1986); In re Futch, 144 Mich App 163, 
375 NW2d 375 (1984); In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich App 219,263 NW2d 
37 (1977); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 210 NW2d 482 (1973). 
Moreover, evidence admitted at one hearing may be considered evi-
dence at all subsequent hearings. In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375 
NW2d 788 (1985); In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306 NW2d 487 
(1981); In re Sharpe, 68 Mich App 619, 243 NW2d 696 (1976); LaFlure. 
In addition, evidence regarding the parents' activities up to the date of the 
tennination hearing, including the facts leading to the original petition 
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that prompted placing the child in the temporary custody of the court, is 
admissible. Adrianson; LaFlure. 
Expert medical, psychological, and social work information is often 
presented to or requested by the juvenile court judge to resolve issues in 
cases of child abuse and neglect. See, e.g., In reA/bring, 160 Mich App 
750, 408 NW2d 545 (1987); In re Ferris, 151 Mich App 736, 391 NW2d 
468 (1986); In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich App 475, 376 NW2d 139 (1985). 
"No assertion of an evidentiary privilege, other than the privilege between 
attorney and client, shall prevent the receipt and use, at the dispositional 
phase, of materials prepared pursuant to a court-ordered examination, 
interview, or course of treatment." MCR 5.973(A)(4)(c). For expert testi-
mony that was not court-ordered, see the discussion of privilege in §20.6. 
At trial, the petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence. MCR 5.972(C)(1). Except as provided in MCR 5.980 con-
cerning American Indian children, the petitioner has the burden of proof 
in an action to terminate parental rights and must prove the case by "clear 
and convincing" evidence. MCR 5.974; see also Santosky v Kramer, 455 
US 745 (1982); LaFlure. The petitioner has a higher burden of proof in a 
case involving an American Indian child: the burden of proof is beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (See §20.39.) 
C. Child Witnesses 
§20.13 In cases involving a child witness, MCLA 712A.17b, MSA 
27.3178(598.17b) should be consulted. A witness covered by this sec-
tion is a person under 15 years of age or a person 15 years of age or 
older with a developmental disability. MCLA 712A.17b(l)(b), MSA 
27.3178(598.17b)[1][b]. The statute permits the following methods for 
protecting witnesses: 
1. the use of dolls to assist the witness in testifying on direct or cross-
examination, MCLA 712A.17b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[3] 
2. the use of a support person to sit with, accompany, or be in close 
proximity to the witness (notice must be given to the court and other 
parties before the hearing of the intent to use a support person and of 
the identity of a support person, MCLA 712A.17b(4), MSA 
27 .3178(598.17b)[4]) 
3. the use of a videotape statement of a witness by an investigating 
agency at all proceedings except the adjudication (trial), MCLA 
712A.17b(5), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[5] 
4. if the court finds on the record that the witness would suffer psycho-
logical harm if she or he testified at trial, a videotaped deposition 
may be used at trial in lieu of the witness's testimony, MCLA 
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712A.17b(9), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[9] (The witness may also be 
shielded from seeing the respondent during the videotaped deposi-
tion. MCLA 712A.17b(9), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[9].) 
The court rules allow the use of closed-circuit television, speaker tele-
phone, or "other similar electronic equipment" to protect the parties or 
facilitate court hearings. Further, "[t]he court may appoint an impartial 
psychologist or psychiatrist to ask questions of a child witness at a 
hearing." MCR 5.923(0) and (E). 
Constitutional challenges to the use of videotaped testimony under 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment were addressed in Mary-
land v Craig, 497 US 836 (1990). The trial judge must make a particu-
larized finding that the witness protections are necessary in each case. 
Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, by its terms, 
applies only to criminal cases, the court in In re Brock, 193 Mich App 
652, 485 NW2d 110 (1992), extended its protection in the name of due 
process to child protective proceedings as well. See also In re Vanidestine, 
186 Mich App 205, 463 NW2d 225 (1990). 
D. Notice of Hearing 
§20.14 A summons may be issued and served on a party before a 
proceeding in juvenile court (form 20.5). However, the court must direct 
the service of a summons on the parent or person with whom the minor 
resides for the trial or hearing on a petition seeking termination of paren-
tal rights. MCR 5.920(B). But see MCR 5.920(F) (subsequent notices). 
The summons must identify the nature of the hearing, explain the right to 
counsel and the right to trial by judge or jury, and give "prominent notice" 
that the hearings could result in termination of parental rights. A copy of 
the petition must be attached. MCR 5.920(8)(3); see In re Gillespie, 197 
Mich App 440, 496 NW2d 309 (1992) (father was held not to be legal 
father per statutory definition, and, thus, failure to properly serve him did 
not void termination of his parental rights). The manner and time of 
service of summons must comply with MCR 5.920 and MCLA 712A.l3, 
MSA 27.3178(598.13). 
The respondent, the respondent's attorney, the child or the child's 
attorney, a parent or guardian (if other than the respondent), the petitioner, 
and the guardian ad litem of a party must be notified of each hearing, 
except for dispositional review, permanency planning, and termination of 
parental rights hearings. MCR 5.921(8)(1). For proof of service see form 
20.6. For review and permanency planning hearings, the following per-
sons must be notified pursuant to MCR 5.921 (B )(2): 
I. the agency responsible for the care of the child (usually the DSS) 
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2. the foster parent or custodian of the child, 
3. the parents and the attorney for the parents unless parental rights 
have been terminated 
4. the guardian of the child 
5. the guardian ad litem for the child 
6. the attorney for the child 
7. the child, if 11 years old or older 
8. any tribal leader, if there is tribal affiliation 
9. any other person as directed by the court 
For a termination of parental rights hearing, all those listed in MCR 
5.921(B)(2), plus the prosecuting attorney, must be notified. MCR 
5.921(B)(3). 
Notice may be given in any manner authorized by the rules in sub-
chapter 5.900. Notice of a hearing must be given in writing or on the 
record at least seven days before the hearing unless otherwise provided in 
the court rules. When a child is placed through an emergency placement, 
notice of the preliminary hearing must be given to the parent as soon as 
the hearing is scheduled and may be in person, written, on the record, or 
by telephone. MCR 5.920. A noncustodial parent must be notified of the 
first hearing on the petition, but notice of subsequent hearings is only 
required if the noncustodial parent requests it. MCR 5.921(C). Notifica-
tion to putative fathers is governed by MCR 5.921(D). 
The summons requirements are jurisdictional. If they are not met, 
jurisdiction is not established and orders issued from the proceedings are 
void. The fact that a respondent had actual notice does not cure this 
jurisdictional error. In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 478 NW2d 667 
(1991); In re Brown, 149 Mich App 529, 386 NW2d 577 (1986). However, 
any party who voluntarily appears at the proceedings may waive service 
of process or notice of hearing in writing. MCR 5.920(E); see also In re 
Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375 NW2d 788 (1985). The court of appeals has 
concluded that it is not necessary to serve a respondent personally with a 
petition and summons to a rescheduled hearing if the respondent was 
personally served notice of the originally scheduled hearing, appeared at 
it, agreed to the adjournment, and had actual notice of the rescheduled 
hearing date. In re Andeson, 155 Mich App 615, 400 NW2d 330 (1986); 
see also MCR 5.920(F). In In re Render, 145 Mich App 344, 377 NW2d 
421 (1985), the court of appeals ruled that due process requires that an 
incarcerated parent receive notice and an opportunity to appear and pre-
sent evidence when a parental termination proceeding is commenced. 
Silence, even after notice of the proceeding, will not be taken as a waiver 
of the right to appear when the respondent is in the custody of the state. 
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E. Preliminary Hearings 
§20.15 MCR 5.965 sets out the requirements for a preliminary hear-
ing. The court rule reflects the standards for authorizing a petition and 
for placing the child, which are set out in MCLA 712A.13a, MSA 
27.3178(598.13a). The court must hold a preliminary hearing within 24 
hours (excluding Sundays and holidays) after a child has been taken into 
court custody, "unless adjourned for good cause," or the child must be 
released. MCR 5.965(A). 
At the preliminary hearing, the judge or referee must determine that a 
parent has been notified and, if the parent is not present, direct that an 
attempt be made to secure the parent's presence. The court may adjourn 
the preliminary hearing to secure the appearance of a parent or conduct 
the hearing in the parent's absence. The court must appoint an attorney to 
represent the child at the hearing, but the court may make temporary 
orders to protect the child pending the appearance of counsel or the 
completion of the preliminary hearing. The allegations in the petition 
must be read in open court, unless waived. The respondent must be 
advised of the right to counsel. MCR 5.965(B)(5). 
At the preliminary hearing, the court may dismiss the petition, refer 
the matter to alternative services, or proceed with the hearing. The court 
must advise the respondent of the right to trial and that the trial may be 
conducted by a referee unless the respondent files a written demand for a 
judge or a jury pursuant to MCR 5.911 or 5.912. The court must inquire 
whether the child or parent is a registered member of an American Indian 
tribe or whether the child is eligible for membership. If so, MCR 5.980 
must be observed. (See §20.39.) The court must also allow the respondent 
to deny or admit the allegations in the petition and to explain. MCR 5.965(B). 
The judge or referee must decide whether to authorize the petition to 
be filed and, if so, whether the child should be released to the parent or 
placed pending trial. The court may authorize the petition "upon a show-
ing of probable cause, unless waived, that one or more of the allegations 
in the petition are true" and fall within the jurisdictional requirements of 
MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. MCR 5.965(B)(9). 
If the court authorizes the petition and does not release the child to 
the parent's custody, the court must receive evidence to establish the 
criteria for placement. To place the child with someone other than a 
parent, the following conditions must exist: 
1. Custody with the parent presents "a substantial risk of harm to the 
life, physical health, or mental well being of the child." 
2. No alternative services are available to protect the child from those 
risks in his or her parent's home. 
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3. The conditions of the placement away from the parent "are adequate 
to safeguard the h~alth and welfare of the child." 
MCR 5.965(C)(2). These conditions reflect the policy that a child should 
be placed with a parent unless no services are available to protect the 
child in the home and only when the alternative placement is safer than 
the parent's home. 
The respondent must "be given an opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, and to offer proof to counter the allega-
tions" of the petition. However, the court's findings "may be on the basis 
of hearsay evidence that possesses an adequate degree of trustworthiness. 
. . . [T]he court may adjourn the hearing for up to 14 days to secure the 
attendance of witnesses or for other good cause shown." MCR 5.965(C). 
The requirement to determine probable cause to place a child in foster 
care pending trial is not jurisdictional. In re A/bring, 160 Mich App 750, 
480 NW2d 545 (1987). 
If the court orders a child placed, the judge or referee must make a 
written statement of findings or place them on the record. MCR 
5.965(C)(3). A child removed from his or her home due to abuse or 
neglect must be placed in the "most family-like setting consistent with the 
needs of the child." MCR 5.9i55(C)(4). A child removed from his or her 
home due to abuse or neglect may not be detained in any secure juvenile 
detention facility or adult jail. MCLA 712A.15, MSA 27.3178(598.15). A 
respondent parent, guardian, or custodian has no right to post bail for the 
release of a child when the child is removed from the home due to alleged 
abuse or neglect. MCR 5.956(C)(5). 
When ordering placement, the court must inform the parties that an 
initial services plan will be submitted by the DSS no later than 30 days 
after placement, that participation in the plan is voluntary unless the court 
orders otherwise, and what elements are required in the service plan. 
MCR 5.965(C)(6). In In re Macomber, 436 Mich 386, 399-400, 461 
NW2d 671 (1990), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the juvenile 
court could not order a father out of his home before trial, thus denying 
the juvenile court the power to make orders affecting adults until after the 
adjudication (trial) stage. 
The court rule encourages frequent visitation between the parent and 
child, pending trial, unless even supervised visitation would hann the 
child. MCR 5.965(C)(7). Finally, on the motion of a party, the court is 
required to review orders of custody, placement, or the service plan ~md 
"may modify those orders and plan if it is in the best interest of the child." 
MCR 5.965(C)(8). 
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F. Entering a Plea 
§20.16 "A respondent may make a plea of admission or of no 
contest to the original charge in the petition.". MCR 5.971(A). In its 
discretion, the court may allow the respondent to plead to an amended 
petition. The plea may be taken at any time after the petition is filed, as 
long as the petitioner <md counsel for the child first have an opportunity to 
object. I d. Before accepting a plea, the court must advise the respondent 
on the record or in writing of certain rights and that the respondent's plea 
can be used later to terminate parental rights. MCR 5.971(B). 
The plea must be both voluntary and accurate. The court must satisfy 
itself that the plea is knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. 
MCR 5.971(C)(l). The court does not have to specifically inquire whether 
the plea is knowingly made as long as the court is satisfied that it is. In re 
King, 186 Mich App 458, 465 NW2d 1 (1990). To find that a plea was 
accurately made, the court must find support that the child comes within 
the court's jurisdiction, "preferably by questioning the respondent unless 
the offer is to plead no contest." For a no contest plea, the court must 
"obtain support for a finding that the respondent committed the offense 
against the child" apart from questioning the respondent. "The court shall 
state why a plea of no contest is appropriate." MCR 5.971(C)(2). The 
court in In re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 195, 208,468 NW2d 912 (1991), 
held that a mother's plea to a petition alleging neglect because her child 
was abused in the care of another was insufficiently supported by testi-
mony presented at the time of the plea, rendering the plea and all subse-
quent proceedings void. In addition, see In re Zelzack, 180 Mich App 117, 
446 NW2d 588 (1989), holding a father was not permitted to withdraw his 
no contest plea since evidence existed to support a finding of neglect. 
G. Pretrial Procedures 
§20.17 Pretrial procedures are governed by MCR 5.922. The fol-
lowing materials are discoverable as of right if they are requested no later 
than 21 days before trial: all written or recorded statements and notes of 
statements in the possession or control of the petitioner or a law enforce-
ment agency; all written or recorded nonconfidential statements from any 
person with knowledge of the events, including police reports; the names 
of prospective witnesses; a list of tangible evidence; reports from any 
experts and the results of tests or experiments that are prospective evi-
dence; the results of any lineups or showups; and any search warrants, 
including applications for warrants, affidavits, and returns or inventories. 
The court may permit the discovery of other materials or grant an un-
timely request for materials as specified in MCR 5.922(A)(2). But (f. In re 
Lemmer, 191 Mich App 253, 477 NW2d 503 (1991) (court may not order 
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interviews of children). Motion practice in juvenile court is governed by 
MCR 2.119, except that a motion to suppress evidence must be filed at 
least seven days before the trial or at the trial in the court's discretion. 
MCR 5.922(C). 
The juvenile court has the authority to order further investigation or 
discovery, including the examination of a child by a physician, dentist, 
psychologist, or psychiatrist. MCLA 712A.12, MSA 27.3178(598.12); 
MCR 5.923. At "any time," the court may order the discovery of "other 
evidence," which may include physical or mental examinations of parents. 
ld.; see also MCLA 712A.6, MSA 27.3178(598.6). The court may order a 
parent to undergo a psychological examination for the purpose of deter-
mining whether parental rights should be terminated. In re Johnson, I42 
Mich App 764, 371 NW2d 446 (I985). 
Pretrial conferences in probate court are governed by MCR 5.922(D), 
which states that the scope and effect of a pretrial conference are gov-
erned by MCR 2.40I unless inconsistent with the rules of subchapter 
5.900. The court may direct the parties to appear to settle all pretrial 
matters. Pretrial conferences may serve to clarify the status of a case, 
identify legai issues to be briefed, exchange witness lists and exhibits, and 
set a trial date if the case cannot be resolved without a trial. The parties 
might wish to negotiate visitation, the placement of the child, and the case 
plan for the family. To avoid temporary court jurisdiction, parents might 
be willing to begin counseling or accept services that the DSS feels are 
necessary to protect the child. The DSS may agree to amend the petition 
or to delete certain allegations in exchange for a plea of admission or no 
contest by the respondent under MCR 5.97I(A). 
H. Trial 
§20.18 If the allegations of the petition are contested, a trial must 
be held. Before the adoption of the court rules effective January I, I988, 
this proceeding was referred to as the "adjudicative phase." (See former 
MCR 5.908(A).) 
A trial must be held six months after the filing of a petition if the 
child is not placed. If the child is placed outside his or her home, the trial 
must begin as soon as possible and no later than 63 days after the child is 
placed by the court unless (I) the parties stipulate to delay, (2) proper 
service cannot be completed, or (3) the court finds that the testimony of a 
witness who is not currently available is needed: If trial is postponed for 
reasons (2) or (3), the child must be returned to the parent unless release 
is likely to result in "physical harm or serious emotional damage to the 
child." MCR 5.972(A). 
At trial, the court must ascertain the presence of the proper parties. 
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The respondent has the right to be present, but the court may proceed in 
the respondent's absence if notice has been served on the respondent; 
children may be excused as the court determines their interests require. 
The allegations in the petition must be read unless waived, and the nature 
of the proceedings explained. MCR 5.972(B). See §20.11 regarding the 
parties' right to counsel. 
The parties have the right to a judge at trial. To demand a nonjury 
trial by a judge rather than a referee, a party must file a written demand 
with the court within the time periods specified in MCR 5.91l(B) and 
MCR 5.912(B). A judge must preside at a jury trial. MCR 5.912. 
There is a right to a jury only during the trial; there is no right to a 
jury at the dispositional hearing. MCR 5.9ll(A). "Any person interested 
in the hearing" or the court may demand a jury of six. MCLA 712A.l7(2), 
MSA 27.3178(598.17)[2]. A written request for a jury must be filed with 
the juvenile court within the time periods established in MCR 5.911(B). 
Jury procedure in the juvenile division of the juvenile court is governed 
by MCR 2.510-.516 unless otherwise provided in MCR 5.911(C). In a 
child protective proceeding, a verdict is to be received when five of the 
six jurors agree. I d. 
Also see §20.12. 
I. Initial Dispositional Hearing 
§20.19 Following a trial or a plea of admission or no contest, the 
court holds a dispositional hearing to determine what measures it should 
take with respect to the child and, when applicable, any adults within its 
jurisdiction. The time interval, if any, between trial and disposition is 
within the court's discretion. However, if a child is in placement, the 
interval may not be more than 35 days unless there is "good cause." MCR 
5.973(A). The child need not be present as long as the child's guardian ad 
litem or the child's attorney is present. The respondent has the right to be 
present or may be represented by counsel, but the court may proceed 
without the parties if proper notice has been given. /d. 
If the court finds that a child about whom a petition has been filed is 
not within the provisions of the juvenile code, the court must dismiss the 
petition. If, however, the court finds that the child is within the provisions 
of the code, the court may enter an order of disposition that is "appropri-
ate for the welfare of the child and society in view of the facts proven <md 
ascertained." MCLA 712A.l8, MSA 27.3178(598.18). 
Dispositional alternatives include 
1. warning the child or the parents, guardian, or custodian and dismiss-
ing the petition; 
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2. placing the child on probation or under supervision in his or her own 
home or the home of an adult related to the child, with reasonable 
rules for the conduct of the parents, guardian, or custodian; 
3. placing the child in a licensed foster home; 
4. placing the child in a private institution or agency licensed by the 
state; 
5. committing the child to a public institution or county facility oper-
ated as an agency of the court or county; 
6. providing the child with medical, dental, surgical, or other health care 
and with clothing and other incidental items as the court deems 
necessary; 
7. ordering the parents, guardian, custodian, or any other person to 
refrain from continuing whatever conduct the court believes caused 
or tended to cause the child to come within the provisions of the 
juvenile code; and 
8. appointing a guardian for the child under MCLA 700.424, MSA 
27.5424 and dismissing the petition under MCLA 712A.18, MSA 
27 .3178(598.18). 
The court may order the parent or legally responsible adult to reim-
burse the court for the cost of the child's care and the cost of attorney fees 
to the extent of that person's financial ability. I d. 
The juvenile court's jurisdiction is not limited to the dispositions 
listed in MCLA 712A.18, MSA 27.3178(598.18). In re Macomber, 436 
Mich 386, 399-400, 461 NW2d 671 (1990) (ordering father out of his 
home and requiring him to pay child support fell within juvenile court's 
dispositional powers). However, notice and an opportunity for hearing are 
necessary before such orders are valid. MCLA 712A.18(4), MSA 
27 .3178(598.18)[4]. The court may also order the termination of parental 
rights at the initial disposition (see §20.23). 
If an agency recommends placing a child outside the home, it must 
report in writing the efforts made to prevent the removal of the child or to 
rectify the conditions that caused the removal. The report must specify 
what services were provided to the family or, if services were not pro-
vided, the reasons why. Furthermore, the report must indicate the likely 
harm to the child if the child is either separated from or returned to the 
parent. MCLA 712A.18f, MSA 27.3178(598.18f). The agency must also 
prepare a case service plan, which must be available to the court and all 
the parties before the entry of a dispositional order. The plan must include 
(1) the type of placement and the reasons for the requested placement; (2) 
what the parent must do to have the child returned; (3) what efforts the 
agency will make to return the child to his or her home; (4) the services to 
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be provided the family and foster home to facilitate the child's return to 
the parents; and (5) unless even supervised visitation would be harmful, a 
schedule for regular and frequent visitation not less than once every seven 
days. MCLA 712A.18f(3), MSA 27.3178(598.18[)[3]. The court must 
consider the case service plan before entering a dispositional order. 
MCLA 712A.18f(4), MSA 27.3178(598.18[)[4]; MCR 5.973(A)(5)(b). In 
keeping with the requirments of the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act, the court must include in the order, if appropriate, a finding that 
the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child or 
to rectify the conditions that caused the removal. MCR 5.973(A)(5)(c). If 
the child continues in placement outside of his or her home, the plan must 
be revised and updated every 90 days. MCLA 712A.18f(5), MSA 
27 .3178(598.18[)[5]. In its dispositional order, the court must state 
whether the child is placed in the temporary or permanent custody of the 
court. MCLA 712A.20, MSA 27.3178(598.20). 
Also see §20.12. 
J, Review Hearings 
§20.20 MCLA 712A.19, MSA 27.3178(598.19) and MCR 
5.973(8)(2) require that if a child is placed out of the home, a review 
hearing must be held no more than 91 days after the initial disposition 
order and every 91 days after for the first year. After the first year, review 
hearings must occur every 182 days. The court may decide to shorten the 
interval between review hearings. MCR 5.973(8)(3). Review hearings are 
subject to the same procedures and rules of evidence as dispositional 
hearings. MCR 5.973(8)(5). 
The agency responsible for the care of the child must submit an 
updated service plan at each 91-day review hearing. The report shall be 
available to the court and to all parties. MCLA 712A.18f(5), MSA 
27.3178(598.18[)[5]. It must be offered into evidence. MCLA 712A.19, 
MSA 27.3178(598.19). MCR 5.973(8)(6) sets out the criteria the court 
should use in reviewing the status of the case at the review hearing: the 
services provided, whether the parent has benefited from the services, and 
the extent of parental visitation. MCR 5.973(8)(7) lists the supplemental 
orders available to the court at the review hearing, including the return of 
the child without a hearing. See also MCLA 712A.19, MSA 
27 .3178(598.19). 
K. Permanency Planning Hearing 
§20.21 Legislation in 1988 established a new step in the child 
protection process called a permanency planning hearing. MCLA 
712A.19a, MSA 27.3178(598.19a); MCR 5.973(C). If a child remains in 
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foster care and parental rights to the child have not been terminated, the 
court must conduct a permanency planning hearing not more than 364 
days after the entry of the initial dispositional order and every 364 days 
after if the child continues in foster care. The purpose of the hearing is to 
determine either why the child should not be returned home or why 
parental rights to the child should not be terminated. The court is to 
attempt to establish a permanent placement for the child, either with his or 
her parents or through termination and adoption. 
If the court determines that returning the child "would not cause a 
substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental 
well-being, the court shall order the child returned to his or her parent." 
The court is to view a parent's failure to substantially comply with the 
case service plan as evidence that returning the child would cause a 
substantial risk of harm to the child. MCLA 712A.19a(4), MSA 
27.3178(598.19a)[4]; MCR 5.973(C). 
If the court determines that the child should not be returned to his or 
her parent, the agency must initiate proceedings to terminate parental 
rights within 42 days unless the agency demonstrates that termination is 
clearly not in the child's best interest. MCLA 712A.19a(5), MSA 
27.3178(598.19a)[5]; MCR 5.973(C)(4)(c). However, filing the petition 
after 42 days does not necessitate the dismissal of the case or the setting 
aside of the termination order on appeal. In re Prater, 189 Mich App 330, 
471 NW2d 658 (1991); In re Kirkwood, 187 Mich App 542, 468 NW2d 
280 (1991). If the child is not returned, termination proceedings are not 
initiated, and the court determines that other pennanent placements are 
not possible; the court must order either short- or long-term foster care. 
MCLA 712A.19a(6), MSA 27.3178(598.19a)[6]; MCR 5.973(C)(4)(d). 
IV. Termination of Parental Rights 
A. Introduction 
§20.22 Generally, courts are reluctant to terminate parental rights 
without first trying to reunite the family. In re Mathers, 371 Mich 516, 
124 NW2d 878 (1963). A situation justifying temporary custody does not 
necessarily justify the termination of parental rights. In re LaFlure, 48 
Mich App 377, 210 NW2d 482 (1973). Any termination of parental rights 
must be based on circumstances that establish or seriously threaten long-
term neglect or severe abuse. Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 NW2d 604 
(1958). The termination of parental rights severs the rights of the natural 
parents to their child. MCLA 712A.20, MSA 27.3178(598.20); Fritts. The 
proper inquiry in these cases is whether the state has proved that the 
respondent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence according to statu-
tory standards, not whether the child would be better off in foster care. In 
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re Bedwell, 160 Mich App 168, 408 NW2d 65 (1987). 
The petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that statutory grounds for termination exist. MCR 5.974(A)(2); 
see also In re Schejbal, 131 Mich App 833, 346 NW2d 597 (1984); In re 
Atkins, 112 Mich App 528, 316 NW2d 477 (1982). (Note that the burden 
of proof is higher in termination cases involving American Indian chil-
dren. See §20.39.) Once that standard is met, the juvenile court should 
consider the best interests of the child in exercising its power to terminate 
parental rights. MCR 5.974(A)(1); In re Tedder, 150 Mich App 688, 389 
NW2d 149 (1986); In re McDuel, 142 Mich App 479, 369 NW2d 912 
(1985); Schejbal. Both steps may be accomplished at one hearing. MCR 
5.974(A)(l). There is no right to a jury trial at proceedings to terminate 
parental rights. MCR 5.974(A)(2); see also In re Oakes, 53 Mich App 
629, 220 NW2d 188 (1974). 
For the purpose of termination hearings, respondent includes the 
natural or adoptive mother of the child and the father of the child as 
defined by MCR 5.903(A)(4). The word does not include any other per-
sons. MCR 5.974(B). Also see §20.14, describing the special notice re-
quirements for hearings for the termination of parental rights. 
Parental rights may not be terminated unless termination was re-
quested in an original, an amended, or a supplemental petition filed by the 
prosecutor, an agency, or a representative of the child and served on the 
respondent as required by MCR 5.920. MCR 5.974(A), (C). MCLA 
712A.19b(l), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[1] was recently amended to permit 
the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights by a guardian 
or custodian of the child as well. Form 20.3 is used to petition for the 
termination of parental rights, with the factual allegations attached on a 
separate sheet of paper. Adoptive parents lack standing to petition for the 
termination of their own parental rights. In re Swope, 190 Mich App 478, 
476 NW2d 459 (1991). An order terminating parental rights under the 
juvenile code may not be entered unless the court makes findings of fact 
and states conclusions of law on the record or in a written opinion and 
includes the statutory basis for the order within 28 days after the proofs. 
MCR 5.974(G). 
The juvenile court has the authority, at the initial dispositional hear-
ing, to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances. MCR 
5.974(0). However, if the court places the child in foster care at the initial 
dispositional hearing, the court may later consider whether to terminate 
parental rights under MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.19b); MCR 
5.974(E), (F). Most Michigan cases that result in the termination of 
parental rights are decided under this statute after the court has provided 
an opportunity for the parents to correct the problems that initially 
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brought the child under the jurisdiction of the court. However, there is no 
constitutional or statutory right to the preservation of the family unit. Doe 
v Oettle, 97 Mich App 183, 293 NW2d 760 (1980). 
If there is clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for 
termination, the court may conditionally terminate parental rights, giving 
parents an opportunity to comply with the listed conditions and have the 
termination order set aside. In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306 
NW2d 487 (1981). But see Bedwell (criticizing this procedure). 
The issue whether the court may terminate the rights of only one 
parent under the juvenile code has not been clear. The court rules appear 
to allow the rights of one parent to be terminated in child protective 
proceedings. MCR 5.974. The Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that 
a juvenile court must make findings that support terminating the rights of 
each parent and may terminate the rights of only one parent. In re Arntz, 
418 Mich 941, 344 NW2d 1 (1984); see also In re Campbell, 129 Mich 
App 780, 342 NW2d 607 (1983). A parent may voluntarily consent to 
termination of his or her parental rights, which would not require the 
juvenile court to announce a statutory basis for termination. In re Toler, 
193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992). 
The Michigan Adoption Code clearly allows the court to terminate 
the parental rights of one parent under certain circumstances. E.g., MCLA 
710.39(3), .51(6), MSA 27.3178(555.39)[3], (555.51)[6]. Under the code, 
parental rights may voluntarily be terminated through a release of parental 
rights, MCLA 710.28, .29, MSA 27.3178(555.28), (555.29), or by a puta-
tive father's nonassertion of his rights or interest in a child, MCLA 
710.37, MSA 27.3178(555.37). Parental rights of a putative father may 
involuntarily be terminated under the code. MCLA 710.37, .39, MSA 
27 .3178(555.37), (555.39). A noncustodial parent's.rights may also invol-
untarily be severed on the petition of a stepparent who wishes to adopt a 
child. MCLA 710.51(6), MSA 27.3178(555.51)[6]. See §§18.27-18.32 
regarding the termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code. 
B. At the Initial Dispositional Hearing 
§20.23 Termination need not be a two-stage process in which the 
child is made first a temporary ward of the court and subsequently a 
permanent ward pursuant to MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.1%). A 
child may be placed in the permanent custody of the court at the initial 
dispositional hearing under the circumstances specified in MCR 5.974(D). 
MCLA 712A.19b(4), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[4]. 
There are four requirements for termination at the initial disposition: 
1. The original or amended petition must request termination. 
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2. The trier of fact must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the child comes under the jurisdiction of the court. MCLA 712A.2(b), 
MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. 
3. On the basis of legally admissible, clear, and convincing evidence at 
the trial or plea, the court finds that one or more of the petition's 
allegations are true, justify terminating at the inital disposition, and 
fall under the statutory grounds for termination at MCLA 
712A.l9b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3]. 
4. On the basis of all relevant and material evidence, see MCR 
5.974(F)(2), the court determines that termination is in the best inter-
est of the child. 
MCR 5.974(D). 
C. After the Child Resides in Foster Care 
1. In General 
§20.24 MCLA 712A.l9b, MSA 27.3178(598.19b) applies if a child 
is in foster care in the temporary custody of the court and the court 
subsequently finds that it is appropriate to terminate parental rights. In 
such a case, there typically is a period when attempts are made to help the 
family correct existing problems. During this time, the social worker may 
conclude that the family cannot be reunited and that the termination of 
parental rights is the appropriate action. This approach has two stages: (I) 
temporary custody and (2) a supplemental petition seeking to terminate 
parental rights, alleging one or more of the grounds listed in § 19b. MCR 
5.974(F) governs termination proceedings under this section. 
A supplemental petition to terminate parental rights must be filed no 
later than 42 days after a review or permanency planning hearing. A 
termination hearing must be held within 42 days after the filing of a 
supplemental petition. "The court may, for good cause shown, extend the 
time period for an additional 21 days." MCR 5.974(F)(l). 
MCLA 712A.19b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3] outlines nine sepa-
rate legal grounds for the termination of parental rights when a child 
remains in foster care in the temporary custody of the juvenile court. 
These are discussed individually in §§20.25-20.31. 
2. Desertion 
§20.25 Desertion of a child forms the first basis for terminating 
parental rights. Parental rights may be terminated under MCLA 
712A.l9b(3)(a), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][a] if "[t]he child has been 
deserted under either of the following circumstances:" (I) the parent is 
unidentifiable, has deserted the child for 28 or more days, and has not 
20-30 
Child Protection Law and Procedure §20.26 
sought custody during that period or (2) the parent has deserted the child 
for 91 or more days and has not sought custody during that period. A 
parent is "unidentifiable" if the parent cannot be identified after "reason-
able efforts have been made to locate and identify the parent." 
In 1988, this section was amended to change· the time for abandon-
ment from six months to 91 days. Cases decided under the old rule should 
still be instructive. Intent to desert or abandon is shown by a failure to 
provide support or to communicate. Minimal contact between parent and 
child need not defeat this subsection as a basis for termination since the 
court may declare a child deserted or abandoned if the parent or guardian 
has not made "regular <md substantial efforts" to support or communicate 
with the child. In re Sharpe, 68 Mich App 619, 243 NW2d 696 (1976). 
Failure to provide support or to communicate for six months is presump-
tive evidence of an intent to abandon. In re Sterling, 162 Mich App 328, 
412 NW2d 284 (1987); In re Sears, 150 Mich App 555, 389 NW2d 127 
(1986). Even if a parent communicates with the child during a six-month 
period, parental rights may be terminated if the parent fails to provide 
support during that time. In re Andeson, 155 Mich App 615, 400 NW2d 
330 (1986); see also In re Nelson, 190 Mich App 237, 475 NW2d 448 
(1991); In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 469 NW2d 56 (1991); In re 
Webster, 170 Mich App 100, 427 NW2d 596 (1988). 
3. Physical Injury or Sexual Abuse 
§20.26 The termination of parental rights due to physical or 
sexual abuse is pennitted under MCLA 712A.I9b(3)(b), MSA 
27.3178(598.19b)[3][b], which reads: 
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury 
or physical or sexual abuse under either of the following circum-
stances: 
(i) A parent's act caused the ... abuse and the court finds that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or 
abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home. 
(ii) A parent who had the opportunity to prevent the ... abuse 
failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if 
placed in the parent's home. 
Note that this language allows termination based on the injury to a sibling 
of a child. It also addresses both the assailant and the parent who failed to 
protect. The abuse alone is not enough, since the court must also find a 
risk to harm in the foreseeable future if the child is returned. 
Even before this section was amended in 1988, to explicitly recognize 
failure to protect, case law dealt with a parent's duty to protect. In In re 
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Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 451 NW2d 576 (1990), a mother's rights were 
terminated because she gave the abusive father access to the children. 
Parental rights may be terminated for neglect if a parent permits an 
environment to exist in which children will likely be abused, even though 
that parent has not personally abused the child. In re Parshall, 159 Mich 
App 683, 406 NW2d 913 (1987). The inability of a parent to protect 
children from sexual assault and the failure to prevent further contact with 
the assailant are grounds for termination. In re Sprite, 155 Mich App 531, 
400 NW2d 320 (1986); In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich App 475, 376 NW2d 
139 (1985). 
4. No Progress by Parents 
§20.27 MCLA 712A.19b(3)(c), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][c] al-
lows the termination of parental rights if, after 182 days have elapsed 
since the initial dispositional order, "[t]he conditions that led to the 
adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the 
age of the child" or the parents have failed to rectify "other conditions" 
that place the child under the jurisdiction of the court. This section relates 
to the progress that the court should be reviewing every 91 days at review 
hearings. If progress has been poor and the outlook for change is poor, the 
termination of parental rights may be pursued under this section. In In re 
Dahms, 187 Mich App 644,468 NW2d 315 (1991), a mother's rights were 
terminated pursuant to this section due to her need for two or three more 
years of therapy before she could resume parenting. See also In re Mcin-
tyre, 192 Mich App 47, 480 NW2d 293 (1991) (respondent's continued 
incarceration indicated that conditions would not change). 
An order terminating parental rights was reversed when the court felt 
the parents had not been given adequate services and opportunities to 
improve. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 472 NW2d 38 (1991). A 
parent's failure to comply fully with a DSS treatment plan does not 
establish neglect without clear and convincing evidence that the treatment 
plan was necessary to improve the parent's allegedly neglectful behavior. 
In re Mason, 140 Mich App 734, 364 NW2d 301 (1985); In re Moore, 134 
Mich App 586, 351 NW2d 615 (1984). 
As to the parents' duty to produce evidence of their efforts to rectify 
the conditions, the court in In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 388, 210 
NW2d 482 (1973), held that it was appropriate to place the burden of 
going forward (but not the burden of proof) on the parents, which "merely 
requires the parents to give any indication whatsoever that the family 
situation has improved." See also In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 445 NW2d 
161 (1989). Both cases were decided under the former statutory language. 
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Also under the former language of this section, evidence justifying a 
finding that the parents would not reestablish a proper home for their 
child within the next 12 months was discussed in In re Pasco, 150 Mich 
App 816, 389 NW2d 188 (1986), and In re Ovalle, 140 Mich App 79, 363 
NW2d 731 (1985). 
5. Failure of a Guardianship 
§20.28 MCLA 712A.19b(3)(d)-(f), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][d]-[f] 
are products of a 1990 amendment of the juvenile code and provide a basis 
for the termination of parental rights in cases involving guardianships. 
These three bases for the termination of parental rights correspond to the 
three bases for taking jurisdiction in cases involving guardianships. MCLA 
712A.2(b)(3)-(5), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b][3)-[5]. Guardianships over mi-
nors are granted under MCLA 700.424a, .424b, and .424c, MSA 
27.5424(1), (2), and (3). Establishment of a "limited guardianship place-
ment plan" is required by 1990 amendments whenever a parent voluntarily 
turned over guardianship of a child to a third person. MCLA 700.424a, 
MSA 27.5424(1). The plan sets out what is expected from the parent before 
the child will be returned to the parent's custody. Termination of parental 
rights under MCLA 712A.19b(3)(d), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][d] may be 
granted when a parent "has substantially failed, without good cause, to 
comply with a limited guardianship placement plan" and the court finds 
that the noncompliance has disrupted the parent-child relationship. Termi-
nation may also be granted when a parent fails to comply with a "court-
structured plan" developed for involuntary guardianships. MCLA 
712A.19b(3)(e), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][e]. Finally, the court may ter-
minate parental rights when any parent whose child has a guardian both 
fails to support and fails to stay in contact with his or her child. MCLA 
712A.19b(3)(f), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][f]. 
6. No Proper Care or Custody 
§20.29 What seems to be an all-encompassing basis for termination 
appears in MCLA 712A.19b(3)(g), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][g]: "The 
parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for 
the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time consid-
ering the age of the child." This 1988 amendment clarified a dispute over 
whether a parent's neglect must be culpable to terminate by adding the 
phrase "without regard to intent." See In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 444 
NW2d 789 (1989) (culpable neglect is not required to take jurisdiction or 
to terminate parental rights). 
In Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 114, 92 NW2d 604 (1958), the 
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Michigan Supreme Court set a standard for terminating parental rights 
based on neglect: "[W]e hold that, while evidence of temporary neglect 
may suffice for entry of an order taking temporary custody, the entry of an 
order for permanent custody due to neglect must be based upon testimony 
of such a nature as to establish or seriously threaten neglect of the child for 
the long-run future." See also In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 382 NW2d 
842 (1985); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 384, 210 NW2d 482 (1973). 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining what is sufficient 
neglect. "The quantum of neglect necessary to justify termination of 
parental rights ... is not capable of precise or exact definition." In re 
Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 27, 361 NW2d 20 (1984). A parent's long-
term alcohol abuse that detrimentally affects the well-being of the child 
may constitute neglect sufficient to justify the termination of parental 
rights. In re Dupras, 140 Mich App 171, 363 NW2d 26 (1984). But see In 
re Hulbert, 186 Mich App 600, 465 NW2d 36 (1990) (diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder was insufficient to terminate parental 
rights without further evidence of actual neglect). 
7. Parent Imprisoned 
§20.30 A parent who is imprisoned for a period that will deprive the 
child of a "normal home" for more than two years may lose parental rights 
under MCLA 712A.19b(3)(h), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][h]. This section 
does not apply, however, if the parent has actually provided for the child's 
proper care and custody (with a relative, for instance) or will be able to 
provide proper care and custody "within a reasonable time considering the 
age of the child." I d. The calculation of the two years of imprisonment 
begins from the date offiling the petition. In re Perry, 193 Mich App 648, 
484 NW2d 768 (1992); see also In re Neal, 163 Mich App 522, 414 NW2d 
916 (1987). 
Imprisonment alone, without showing that the child will be deprived 
of a normal home for more than two years, is not a sufficient ground for 
termination. In re Kidder, 395 Mich 51, 232 NW2d 672, remanding, 59 
Mich App 204, 229 NW2d 380, leave to appeal granted, 393 Mich 819, on 
remand, 61 Mich App 451, 233 NW2d 495 (1975). Parents may properly 
place their child in a custodial environment of their choosing without court 
intervention as long as that home is fit. In re Taurus F, 415 Mich 512, 330 
NW2d 33 (1982); In re Hurlbut, 154 Mich App 417, 397 NW2d 332 
(1986); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 318 NW2d 567 (1982). 
8. Rights to Sibling Previously Terminated 
§20.31 A court has grounds for tennination if "[p]arental rights to 1 
or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and 
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chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts to rehabili-
tate the parents have been unsuccessful." MCLA 712A.19b(3)(i), MSA 
27.3178(598.19b)[3][i]. This section is likely to be used in the case of a 
new child born to parents who have had their parental rights terminated to 
older siblings. 
D. On the Basis of Changed Circumstances 
§20.32 The court rules also authorize the termination of parental 
rights in cases in which termination is not sought at the initial disposition 
or under MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.1%). MCR 5.974(E). The 
court may act on a new petition requesting the termination of a parent's 
rights to a child who is already a ward of the court on "the basis of one or 
more circumstance new or different from the offense that lead the court to 
take jurisdiction." !d. The new circumstances must warrant the termina-
tion of rights and must fall within the statutory grounds for termination 
under MCLA 712A.19b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3]. For example, ter-
mination on the basis of changed circumstances may be appropriate if a 
child in foster care was seriously harmed by a parent during a visit. 
The new circumstances must be established through clear and con-
vincing, legally admissible evidence. Then the court may decide the best 
interests of the child using any relevant and material evidence. MCR 
5.974(E)(l), (2). 
V. Rehearings and Appeals 
A. Rehearings 
§20.33 Any party may seek a rehearing or new trial by filing a 
written motion within 21 days as specified by MCR 5.992. The judge may 
affirm, modify, or vacate parts or all of any decision under review. MCLA 
712A.21, MSA 27.3178(598.21); MCR 5.992. The court need not hold a 
hearing before ruling on such a motion. A motion for rehearing will not be 
considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented to or 
considered by the court that, if true, would cause the court to reconsider 
the case. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992). The court 
may grant a stay of the order pending a decision on the motion. MCR 
5.992. After a voluntary release of parental rights, a parent must present 
more than just a "change of mind" to support the granting of a rehearing. 
In re Curran, 196 Mich App 380, 493 NW2d 454 (1992). 
B. Appeals 
1. In General 
§20.34 All appeals from the juvenile court must be on a written 
transcript of the record made in the juvenile court or a settled record 
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proposed by the parties and approved by the court. MCLA 600.866(1), 
MSA 27A.866[1]. Except as otherwise provided in MCLA 600.861-.867, 
MSA 27A.861-.867, appeals from the juvenile court are governed by 
supreme court rule. MCLA 600.866(3), MSA 27A.866[3]; see also MCR 
5.993, 7.101, .103, .201 et seq. "Notice of appeal shall be given to all 
interested parties as provided by supreme court rule." MCLA 600.866(2), 
MSA 27A.866[2]. A stay of proceedings from an order of the juvenile 
division of the juvenile court may be obtained only by application to 
the appellate court. MCLA 600.867(2), MSA 27 A.867[2]; MCR 
7.101(H)(2)(b). Generally, an appeal must be taken within 21 days after 
the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. MCR 7.101(B)(1), 
.103(B)(l), .204(A)(l). 
The court must advise the respondent parent of the right to appeal and 
to counsel on appeal immediately after the entry of an order terminating 
parental rights. MCR 5.974(H). See form 20.7. A delayed appeal from an 
order terminating parental rights must be filed within 63 days after the 
entry of the order of termination or the order denying its reconsideration 
or rehearing. The name of the child victim in a child protective proceed-
ing on appeal will be deleted from published opinions and replaced with 
the child's initials. MCR 5.993(0). 
When timely requested, counsel will be furnished to an indigent 
respondent desiring to appeal an order terminating parental rights. MCR 
5.974(H). The court is also authorized to furnish transcripts at public 
expense under such circumstances. ld.; see also Reist v Bay Cty Circuit 
Judge, 396 Mich 326, 241 NW2d 55 (1976). 
2. Appeals as of Right to the Court of Appeals 
§20.35 MCLA 600.861, MSA 27A.861 states that a party to a pro-
ceeding in juvenile court may appeal as a matter of right to the court of 
appeals any final order that places the child under court supervision, 
removes the child from the party's home, or terminates parental rights. 
See also MCR 5.993(A). There is no appeal by right to the court of 
appeals if the juvenile court denies the termination of parental rights. 
However, the state may seek termination again "after gathering more or 
better evidence," Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 764 (1982), or proceed 
with an appeal to the circuit court as described in §20.36. 
3. Appeals to the Circuit Court 
§20.36 Unless otherwise prohibited by statute, a person aggrieved 
by an order, a sentence, or a judgment of the juvenile court, other than an 
order appealable under MCLA 600.861, MSA 27 A.861, may appeal to the 
circuit court in the county where the order, sentence, or judgment is 
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rendered. An interlocutory appeal must be by application, not as a matter 
of right. MCLA 600.863(1), MSA 27 A.863[1]; MCR 5.993(B). 
Instead of appealing to the circuit court, a party may appeal by leave 
directly to the court of appeals if the juvenile court certifies that "(a) the 
order involves a controlling question of law in which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion, and (b) an appeal directly to the Court of 
Appeals may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion." MCR 5.993(A)(2). 
If an appeal of right within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is filed 
in the court of appeals, the court of appeals may transfer the appeal to the 
circuit court. MCR 5.993(C). 
C. Standard of Review 
§20.37 The standard for appellate review of an order terminating 
parental rights is the "clearly erroneous" standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re 
Cornet, 422 Mich 274, 373 NW2d 536 (1985). A finding is "clearly 
erroneous" if "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 671, 382 NW2d 
842 (1985). For the standard applied to the decision that termination is in 
the best interest of the child, see In re Mcintyre, 192 Mich App 47, 480 
NW2d 293 (1991). 
D. Reviews of Referee Decisions 
§20.38 Unless a party demands a trial by a judge or a jury pursuant 
to MCR 5.911 and 5.912, the court may assign a referee to hear the trial 
and the disposition of a child protective proceeding. MCLA 712A.10, 
MSA 27.3178(598.10); MCR 5.913. At the conclusion of the dispositional 
hearing, the referee must inform the child, the parents, and the respondent 
of the right to file a written request to have the referee's recommended 
findings and conclusions reviewed by a judge. /d. Such a request must 
state the reason for review and be filed within seven days after the hearing 
(form 20.8). The judge may affirm, modify, or deny the recommendation 
of the referee. No hearing is required. MCR 5.991. 
VI. Indian Child Welfare Act 
§20.39 Child custody proceedings involving the foster care place-
ment of or termination of parental rights to an Indian child are subject to 
the specific federal procedures and standards outlined in the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq. In re Johanson, 156 Mich App 608, 402 
NW2d 13 (1986); In re Morgan, 140 Mich App 594, 364 NW2d 754 
(1985). MCR 5.980 provides special rules for emergency removal, place-
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ment, and voluntary and involuntary termination of parental rights to 
Indian children. An Indian child is defined by 25 USC 1903(4) as any 
unmarried person under 18 years of age who is a member of an Indian 
tribe or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child 
of a member of an Indian tribe. In Johanson, the court of appeals held that 
the fact that a child might have an Indian heritage does not qualify the 
child under the act. 
The court will be held to the provisions of the act only if it knows or 
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. Petitions in child 
protective proceedings must state, if known, the child's membership or 
eligibility for membership in an American Indian tribe or band. MCR 
5.96l(B). 
In general, notice provisions in such cases vary with state law, and 
the burden of proof is higher than in proceedings involving non-Indian 
children. For example, parental rights may not be terminated unless sup-
ported by evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt," which must include the 
testimony of "qualified expert witnesses" that continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian "is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USC 1912(f). Such expert 
witnesses must have expertise '"beyond the normal social worker qualifi-
cations."' Morgan, 140 Mich App at 603 n3; see also In re Kreft, 148 
Mich App 682, 384 NW2d 843 (1986). 
In addition, the petitioner must show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
"active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabili-
tation programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family" but 
that the efforts were unsuccessful. Morgan, 140 Mich App at 603-604 
(citing 25 USC 1912(d)-(f)). 
Federal law allows "any Indian child," "any parent or Indian custo-
dian," and "the Indian child's tribe" to petition any court of competent 
jurisdiction to invalidate the foster care placement of or termination of 
parental rights to an Indian child under state law on showing that the 
action violated certain provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Law. 25 
USC 1914; see also Morgan. 
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